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Welfare and incarceration policies have converged to form a system of
governance over socially marginalized groups, particularly racial minorities. In
both of these policy areas, rehabilitative and social support objectives have
been replaced with a more punitive and restrictive system. The authors
examine the convergence in individual-level attitudes concerning welfare and
criminal punishment, using national survey data. The authors’ analysis
indicates a statistically significant relationship between punitive attitudes
toward welfare and punishment. Furthermore, accounting for the
respondents’ racial attitudes explains the bivariate relationship between
welfare and punishment. Thus, racial attitudes seemingly link support for
punitive approaches to opposition to welfare expenditures. The authors
discuss the implications of this study for welfare and crime control policies by
way of the conclusion.
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Welfare benefits are intended to help the poor, and criminal
punishment ostensibly sanctions law violators. On their face, these two
policy arenas might seem distally related, but we posit they are
interconnected in important ways. In the contemporary United States,
an overall expansion of criminal punishment and rising incarceration
rates have coincided with a contraction of welfare assistance and a
reduction in the number of welfare recipients (Garland,1985, Soss &
Schram, 2008; Wacquant, 2001, 2008). These trends replicate at the
state level, in that states with more generous welfare policies tend to
have less punitive incarceration policies, and vice versa (Beckett &
Western, 1999). This finding leads Beckett and Western (1999) to
argue that penal and welfare systems have converged into “a single
policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (p. 44).
The expansion of criminal punishment and contraction of welfare
disproportionately affect racial minorities who are overrepresented
among those governed by the criminal justice and welfare systems. In
addition, policy debates about welfare and punishment have been
infused with racialized language and stigmatization (Edsall & Edsall,
1991). Welfare reform debates, for example, have included explicit
and implicit references to “welfare queens,” illegitimacy, a poor work
ethic, and intergenerational welfare dependency (Hancock, 2004;
Mink, 1998; Naples, 1997; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001). These
references, along with the term welfare itself, are racially coded such
that they are widely understood to refer to Black women (Neubeck &
Cazenave, 2001). In political debates, crime and punishment are also
frequently understood and discussed in racial terms. The “dangerous,”
menacing and incorrigible qualities of criminals as racial codes for
Black men has been well documented in policy debates regarding
sports-based crime prevention programs like Midnight Basketball
(Wheelock & Hartmann, 2007) and political campaigns (Mendelberg,
2001).
Although the convergence of criminal punishment and welfare
policies is well documented, there have been few efforts to investigate
whether individual attitudes concerning these policy regimes have also
merged. We do not propose that policies can be reduced to their public
support. Such a position would be an oversimplified account of the
relationship between public support and policy formation. However, we
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do feel there is reason to believe that policies and their respective
public views share a mutually constitutive connection.1 To the extent
that public opinion and public policy are related, then support for
welfare retrenchment likely coincides with public views to enhance
criminal punishment.
Our exploration of the link between individual attitudes toward
welfare expenditures and criminal punishment advances prior research
that treats perceptions toward these policies as largely separate and
unrelated. This research establishes that racial attitudes shape
opinions regarding welfare (Dyck & Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999;
Kinder & Sanders, 1996) and perceptions of criminal punishment
(Chiricos et al., 1997; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Unnever & Cullen,
2010). We examine whether racial attitudes, such as perceived
intergroup conflict and belief in the stereotype that Blacks have a poor
work ethic, shape individual understandings of welfare and criminal
punishment. Specifically, we consider the following questions: Are
welfare and punishment connected at the individual level such that
opposition to welfare expenditures increases as support for harsh
punitive sanctions increases? If so, to what extent do racial attitudes
condition this relationship? Finally, are racial attitudes significant
predictors of welfare and punitive attitudes?
Our article is organized as follows. The following section further
discusses the connections between welfare and criminal justice policy,
including their role in regulating the behavior of marginalized
populations and the surrounding racial dynamics of this arrangement.
Next, we turn our attention to prior research on individual opinions
toward welfare and punishment, paying close attention to how they
are shaped by racial attitudes. Then, our data analysis proceeds in
three steps. First, we test whether support for welfare expenditures
and punitive attitudes are related at the bivariate level. Second, we
examine whether this relationship holds after statistically controlling
for relevant factors, including multiple indicators of racial attitudes.
Employing multiple racial attitude measures allows us to conduct a
nuanced and rigorous test of the role of racial attitudes. Third, we
examine whether racial attitudes structure support for welfare
expenditures and harsh criminal sanctions. In sum, our analysis
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focuses on the link between punitive and welfare attitudes and on the
role racial attitudes play in this relationship.

Welfare and Punishment as Social Control
Previous research has explored the role of state policy in
monitoring and regulating the behavior of marginalized groups.
Garland (1985) argued that penal practice and welfare policies aligned
to form mutually reinforcing social institutions of control during the
latter half of the 19th century in Victorian England. During this period,
the penal system was “one element in a network of social institutions
that addressed themselves to the disciplinary, moral and political
regulation of these lower classes” (Garland, 1985, p. 40). He goes on
to argue that many broad social, economic, and political factors led to
the convergence of punishment and welfare as social control policies
during Victorian England. This early convergence of penal and welfare
systems embodied a “rehabilitative ideal,” which emphasized the
state’s responsibility to help reintegrate marginalized groups (Garland,
cited in Haney, 2004, p. 335). Welfare and criminal justice policies
have again conjoined in the United States, but this recent union is
characterized by “the decline of the rehabilitative ideal” and the rise of
a more punitive orientation to welfare and punishment (Garland,
2001).
Welfare and penal policy have converged as forms of social
control in the contemporary United States. Drawing on EpsingAndersen’s (1990) concept of “policy regimes,” Beckett and Western
(1999) argued that welfare and penal policies cluster into a single
policy regime that varies across states. Some states have inclusive
policy regimes that “emphasize the need to improve and integrate the
socially marginal and tend to place more emphasis on the social
causes of marginality” (p. 44). Others adopt exclusionary regimes that
“emphasize the undeserving and unreformable nature of deviants,
tend to stigmatize and separate the socially marginal, and are hence
more likely to feature less generous welfare benefits and more punitive
anti-crime policies” (p. 44). By the mid-1990s, states with high
incarceration rates tended to have less generous welfare systems,
whereas states with low incarceration rates tended to have more
generous welfare systems (Beckett & Western, 1999).
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The increase in incarceration over the past 30 years is well
documented. In 2009, prison and jails in the United States housed
more than 2.2 million inmates, for an overall incarceration rate of 743
per 100,000 in the population (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010).
Although the incarceration rate has increased among all racial groups
during the modern era of penal policy, the increase among African
Americans has been especially dramatic (see, e.g., Clear, 2007; Pettit
& Western, 2004; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Western, 2006). Although
these trends in criminal punishment began in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the passage of the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act marked
the realignment of the political landscape concerning crime control
policies. Being tough on crime was no longer a conservative position,
as this legislation demonstrated that liberals also supported punitive
crime control measures. During the period between 1994 (the passage
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act) and 2001, the population under
criminal justice supervision increased nearly 28% (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2007).2 Figure 1 displays the increase in prison rates between
1980 and 2006.
Figure 1 also shows that as incarceration rates have soared,
welfare caseloads have declined. After a drastic increase during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the percentage of the U.S. population
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) remained
steady during the 1970s and then declined somewhat during the
1980s. After increasing during the early 1990s, the percentage of the
population on AFDC or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
started to decline before implementation of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and
continued declining after implementation. As Figure 1 shows, the
percentage of the population on AFDC or TANF declined from 5.4% in
1993 to 2.1% in 2000.
In 1996, the PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF, placing greater
restrictions on access to cash assistance. In doing so, it eliminated the
entitlement put in place by the 1935 Social Security Act, meaning that
cash assistance was no longer guaranteed based on financial need.
The PRWORA established new time limits that limited welfare eligibility
to 5 years or fewer, imposed work requirements as a condition of
receiving assistance, and increased the ability of caseworkers to
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sanction welfare recipients by reducing or terminating assistance. It
also allowed states to implement family caps that deny benefit
increases to women who have additional children while on welfare and
to force mothers to identify the father of their children (Mink, 1998).
In addition, certain provisions explicitly linked welfare benefits to crime
control. The PRWORA imposed a lifetime ban from receiving TANF
funds on individuals convicted of certain felony offenses and prohibited
those accused of a parole or probation violation from receiving aid
(Haney, 2004).
The expansion of criminal punishment and retrenchment of
welfare has had a disproportionately large impact on African
Americans. Nationwide, young black men have a 28% likelihood of
incarceration during their lifetime (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003);
this estimate exceeds 50% among young Black high school dropouts
compared to 11% for comparable White men (Western, 2006).
Incarceration has become so commonplace among young African
American males that it is likened it to a common life course event:
“recent birth cohorts of black men are more likely to have prison
records (22.4%) than military records (17.4%) or bachelor’s degrees
(12.5%)” (Pettit & Western, 2004, p. 164). With regards to welfare,
Black welfare recipients have outnumbered White recipients (Schram,
2006). In 1999, for example, 30.5% of welfare recipients were White,
38.3% were Black, and 24.5% were Hispanic (Schram, 2006, p. 207).3
Other evidence suggests that Black and White women have different
and unequal experiences in the welfare system. African Americans are
projected to comprise more than two thirds of the family who will be
forced out of the welfare system due to the 5-year federal time limits
established by the PRWORA (Duncan, Harris, & Boisjoly, cited in Soss,
Schram, & Fording 2006, p. 18). Also, under the PRWORA, African
American welfare recipients are more likely than Whites to be
sanctioned with reduced or terminated benefits (Schram, Soss,
Fording, & Houser, 2009).
As a whole, prior research rarely links welfare enrollment
contractions with the expansion of criminal punishment while couching
these changes in specific racial terms. Wacquant’s (2008) work on the
emergence of the contemporary “ghetto” in the new era of the penalwelfare state represents one of the few efforts to emphasize the
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broader social forces contributing to the shifting roles of welfare and
penal policies in managing marginalized groups. According to
Wacquant (2008), the emergence of incarceration as a key institution
in the lives of many African Americans reflects a reorganization of
state policies, including welfare, and economic transformation:
Since the debilitating crisis of the ghetto, symbolized by the
great wave of urban revolts that swept the country during the
mid-1960s, it is the prison that is in turn serving as a surrogate
ghetto by warehousing the fractions of the African Americans
(sub) proletariat that have been marginalized by the transition
to the dual service economy and state policies of welfare
retrenchment and urban withdrawal. (p. 3).
As the amount of decent jobs and state assistance available to
residents of poor urban communities has declined, poor African
Americans have become more marginalized and more likely to be
incarcerated.

Attitudes Concerning Punishment, Welfare, and
Race
A wealth of social science research has examined different
dimensions of public opposition toward welfare (Dyck & Hussey, 2008;
Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kluegel & Smith, 1986) and
support for harsh criminal sanctions (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld,
2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Much of
the work concerning welfare attitudes considers the extent to which
economic ideology, principled opposition to government intervention,
and racial attitudes explain opposition to welfare spending. This line of
scholarship has been central to drawing out the underlying factors that
shape public resistance to welfare programs. Equally central in
literature concerning punitive attitudes has been research that
examines the degree to which punitive attitudes result from a
collective sense of group values or intergroup conflict and the tension
between minority and majority group members.
Negative attitudes about Blacks have emerged as a key
explanatory variable capable of predicting opposition to welfare
spending. Belief in the stereotype that Blacks have a poor work ethic is
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a particularly strong predictor of Whites’ opposition to welfare (Dyck &
Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997).
The work ethic stereotype retains its importance even in the postPRWORA environment, where welfare has become less controversial,
less visible, and less racialized in public discourse (Dyck & Hussey,
2008). The perception that welfare primarily benefits Blacks also
generates opposition to welfare among Whites (Gilens, 1999).
Similarly, negative attitudes about Blacks have emerged as a
key predictor of attitudes toward crime and criminal punishment.
Studies show that attitudes toward African Americans can shape
perceptions of neighborhood crime (Quillian & Pager, 2001), fear of
crime (Chiricos et al., 1997), and punitive attitudes (Unever & Cullen,
2010). In addition, support for harsh criminal punishment is connected
to the typification of crime as a racialized social phenomenon (Chiricos,
Welch, & Gertz, 2004). That is, White respondents who viewed
criminals as being primarily Black were more likely to support harsh
criminal sanctions net of demographic factors, crime salience
variables, and attitude measures. In related work, D. Johnson (2008)
found that racial prejudice expressed by Whites and perceived racial
bias on the part of Blacks largely account for the racial gap in
punitiveness. Additional studies have linked racial stereotyping (Peffley
et al., 1997) with higher levels of punitiveness. We expect the
relationship between support for welfare spending and punitive
criminal policies to diminish to nonsignificance after we include the
perception that African American disadvantage is explained by a lack
of hard work and effort in the multivariate models. In addition, those
who perceive hard work and effort as important in explaining African
Americans’ economic disadvantage will likely oppose welfare spending
and support punitive criminal justice policies.
With the exception of Peffley et al. (1997), we are not aware of
research examining attitudes about welfare and crime. Peffley et al.
found that Whites who hold negative racial stereotypes tend to judge
Black welfare recipients and Black drug suspects more harshly than
they judge White welfare recipients and White drug suspects. More
specifically, Whites who question the work ethic of African Americans
are less likely to support providing welfare to Black recipients, and
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Whites who perceive Blacks as “hostile” are more likely to approve of a
police search involving Black suspects (Peffley et al., 1997).
The relationship between individual attitudes and welfare and
criminal justice policies is complicated to discern. In democratic
societies, policies can generally be expected to be consistent with
public opinion, and social scientists have noted that welfare and
criminal justice policy decisions in the United States reflect public
opinion. For example, in the later part of the 20th century, a White
backlash against welfare and other programs perceived as benefiting
urban Blacks contributed to reforms placing greater restrictions on
access to welfare assistance (Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Quadagno, 1994).
More recently, M. Johnson (2006) found that state-level welfare
policies represent public preferences. Similarly, criminal justice policy
is connected to public desires to punish (Savelsberg, 1994). Yet,
because public opinion can be multifaceted, whether a particular policy
outcome represents what the people want may be subject to
interpretation. Also, in addition to public opinion, multiple factors
shape policy outcomes, including the balance of political power, racial
dynamics, policy feedbacks, and institutional characteristics of the
state (Amenta, 1998; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Pierson 1994; 2001a;
2001b; Quadagno, 1994; Skocpol, 1992). Even though a policy
outcome may be consistent with public opinion it is rarely, if ever,
caused by public opinion alone.
The connections between welfare and punishment at the policy
level motivate us to examine the extent to which these issues are
connected in the attitudes of individual Americans. If public opinion
and policies are similarly construed, then we expect to find that
opposition to welfare coincides with support for punitive criminal
sanctions. The first step in our analysis is to determine whether
respondents who oppose welfare spending tend to support punitive
criminal sanctions.
We explore whether racial attitudes affect individual attitudes
toward welfare and punishment, and if so, which specific dimensions of
racial attitudes are the most salient. In addition, we also consider
whether racial animus directed at African Americans mediates the
relationship between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes.
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Extant research identifies several different dimensions of racial
attitudes that might affect public support for welfare and criminal
punishment. This is an important point because many previous studies
have employed only a single measure to capture respondents’ views
toward African Americans. We posit that different dimensions of racial
attitudes are not equally salient predictors of opposition to welfare and
punitive attitudes. Thus, one key contribution of this study is to specify
which measure of racial attitudes best accounts for any connection
between opposition to welfare expenditures and support for criminal
punishment.
We first consider a measure of racial prejudice that is
characterized by an explicit disapproval of a respondent’s son or
daughter marrying a person of African American descent (Bobo &
Kluegel, 1993; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000). Since the period
of heightened civil rights activity in the 1960s, Whites’ racial attitudes
have shifted such that open expressions of disdain for African
Americans have steadily declined (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Schuman,
Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sears et al., 2000). We suggest that
individuals who still express racial prejudice are more likely to oppose
welfare spending and support punitive criminal policies than those who
do not. We examine whether disapproving of a child marrying
someone of African American descent suppresses the association
between support for welfare spending and punitive criminal justice
policies. Furthermore, those who disapprove of a child marrying
someone of African American descent will also tend to oppose welfare
spending and support punitive criminal policies.
A subtle form of racial prejudice has emerged that centers on
the belief that African Americans’ failure to succeed results from
deficiencies in moral character and work ethic, since the Civil Rights
movement ostensibly removed the obstacles that had impeded their
advancement (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000; Kinder & Sanders, 1996;
Kinder & Sears, 1981). These contemporary views of African
Americans have multiple components, with the belief that they have a
poor work ethic central among them (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Also
included in these views is the belief that African Americans should
work their way up without “special favors” such as affirmative action
policies and that discrimination plays a minimal role in explaining racial
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inequality. As previously discussed, the belief that Blacks have a poor
work ethic is a key predictor of opposition to welfare (Dyck & Hussey,
2008; Gilens, 1999; Peffley et al., 1997). We consider whether the
relationship between support for welfare spending and punitive
criminal policies diminishes after we include the perception that African
American disadvantage is explained by a lack of hard work and effort
in the multivariate models. We also consider whether those who
perceive hard work and effort as important in explaining African
Americans’ economic disadvantage tend to oppose welfare spending
and support punitive criminal justice policies.
The final measure of racial attitudes in our analysis draws from
racial threat theory. Racial threat, one variant of the group threat
thesis, focuses on intergroup conflict between racial groups. The group
threat thesis posits that dominant group members perceive a
prerogative over limited social resources such as good jobs,
educational opportunities, and housing (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958).
In this social arrangement, dominant group members view minority
groups as a threat to these resources and thus utilize discrimination
and social control as tools to manage minority groups. Research in this
vein focuses on links between aggregate measures of racial threat,
such as the percentage Black, and individual-level attitudes. For
example, Baumer et al. (2003) found that individuals are more likely
to support capital punishment, net of individual level characteristics,
when they reside in areas with a higher concentration of Blacks.
Taking from this research, we explore whether the perception that
African Americans threaten public order contributes to opposing
welfare spending and supporting punitive criminal sanctions.
Therefore, we examine if the perception that Blacks pose a threat to
public order and safety is a significant predictor of opposition toward
welfare spending and support for harsh criminal sanctions.
Overall, our central aim is to examine whether opposition to
welfare spending and support for more punitive criminal punishment
are linked, and the extent to which any connection is due to racial
prejudice and perceived racial threat. We turn to discussing the data
utilized in this study.
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Data and Method
Our data are from the 2003 American Mosaic Survey (AMS), a
national telephone survey of adults residing in the United States using
random digit dialing and Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
(CATI). The University of Wisconsin Survey Center administered the
survey to 2,081 adults during Summer 2003. The survey was designed
to gather data on attitudes about race, religion, politics, and views
towards the welfare and criminal justice systems, as well as
respondents’ background information. Although the AMS was collected
in 2003, it contains measures on punitive attitudes, welfare attitudes,
and attitudes toward African Americans along several different
dimensions and is therefore well suited to examine the relationships
between these indicators. We are aware of no other survey containing
all these items, which makes the AMS well suited for this study. In
addition, research indicates few, if any, significant shifts in racial
attitudes (Hunt, 2007) or punitiveness (Barkan & Cohn, 2010) since
2003.
The survey administrators randomly selected households, and
then respondents were randomly selected within households.4 The
survey response rate (36%) compares favorably with the response
rates achieved by most national random digit dialing-based studies
(RDD). The extent to which our data are representative of the U.S.
adult population, however, is even more important than the response
rate. Prior work on response bias indicates few differences between
higher response rates obtained by the General Social Survey (GSS)
(50–60% ) and RDD surveys achieving rates between 27% and 36%
with regards to demographic information and attitudinal indicators
(Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000). In line with this
assessment of this study, the data at hand compare well with other
national surveys such as the GSS and the Current Population Survey
(CPS) on responses to a selection of a demographic, belief, and
behavioral measures and has been employed in several recent studies
concerning attitudes concerning religion (Edgel, Hartmann, & Gerteis,
2006) and anti-Semitism (King & Wiener, 2007).
The survey design entailed a split ballot, with one module of
approximately one half of all respondents receiving a battery of certain
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questions and a second module receiving other questions. Only a small
randomized group of survey respondents replied to all of the key racial
attitude indicators as they were split among both modules. Thus,
including all three racial attitude measures restricts analysis to 245
cases.5 However, only a small portion of the analysis relies on the
results of 245 cases. Most of the analysis includes at least 800 cases.
We feel this approach ensures the largest number of cases included in
the analysis while also testing the stability of estimates across
different sample sizes.

Variables
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, punitive attitudes, comprises three
indicators. Respondents were asked whether they strongly agree,
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with three
statements concerning the treatment of criminals: the courts are too
lenient with criminals, we need tougher prison sentences for repeat
offenders, and a person convicted of murder should receive the death
penalty. The response choices were recoded so that, for each
measure, higher scores indicated stronger agreement with each
statement (respondents refusing to answer and those answering “don’t
know” were coded as missing). The three measures were combined
into a single index with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha value of .69.
Our punitive attitudes index ranges from 0 (low punitiveness) through
9 (high punitiveness). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable
are provided in Table 1.

Independent Variables
Attitudes toward welfare expenditures comprise a single
indicator. Survey respondents answered the question, “If you had a
say in making up the federal budget this year, should spending on
welfare-type programs be: increased, decreased, or kept about the
same?” We coded increased as 1, kept the same as 2, and decreased
as 3 so that higher values indicate opposition to welfare spending. We
label this independent variable opposition to welfare spending.
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We use several indicators to capture the different dimensions of
racial attitudes. To test whether open disdain toward African
Americans plays an important role in linking individuals’ views of
welfare expenditures to criminal punishment, we use a survey item
that asks respondents, “People can feel differently about their children
marrying people from various backgrounds. Suppose your son or
daughter wanted to marry an African American. Would you approve of
this choice, disapprove of it or wouldn’t it make any difference at all
one way or the other?” The response categories for the “disapprove of
child marrying someone black” variable are coded as 1 (approve), 2
(no difference), and 3 (disapprove).
As previously stated, extant research shows that covert racial
prejudice has largely supplanted openly hostile views against African
Americans. To capture these subtle and yet potentially salient
perceptions, we include a survey measure that asked respondents, “On
the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people. Please say whether you think each of the following
factors is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or
not at all important in explaining that.” “Lack of effort and hard work”
is one of the factors included in the survey questionnaire.6 We recoded
responses so that those selecting 4 (very important), 3 (somewhat
important), 2 (not very important), and 1 (not important at all). This
variable is labeled “racial inequality due to lack of hard work.”
We next measure perceived racial threat, which indicates
respondents’ perceptions of African Americans as threats to public
order and safety. We constructed the “Blacks threaten public order
variable” from the question, “Do African Americans pose a greater
threat to public order and safety than other groups, a lesser threat, or
about the same as other groups?” Responses were coded 1 if they
responded greater threat for African Americans and coded 0 if
respondents selected lesser threat, equal threat, or they were not
sure.
We also statistically control for a number of demographic
variables potentially correlated with punitive attitudes. Prior research
suggests women are less punitive, at least with respect to
consideration of the death penalty (Baumer et al., 2003).
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Respondent’s sex is measured as a dummy variable where males are
coded as 1. We include a measure for the respondent’s race with a
race dummy variable, where 1 indicates whether a respondent is White
and 0 for all other races. Related research suggests few differences in
punitiveness for respondents with less than postgraduate education
(King & Wheelock, 2007). However, because respondents with
postgraduate degrees tend to be considerably less punitive, we include
a dummy variable indicating a postgraduate degree (all others are in
the reference category). Respondents’ employment status is a
dichotomous indicator where the value 1 indicates the respondent is
not working but currently looking for work, and the value 0 indicates
that the respondent is working. Finally, we control for income, which is
measured using eight categories, the lowest being “Less than $10,000
per year” (coded 1) and the highest being “Over $100,000 per year”
(coded 8).
We also control for several political and religious variables
associated with punitiveness. For instance, we control for Christian
fundamentalism as measured by whether the respondent believes the
bible is the “literal word of God” (coded 1; else coded 0). We
statistically control for these views because prior research suggests
fundamentalists are more punitive (Grasmick, Davenport, Chamblin, &
Bursick, 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994). Given that political
conservatives are generally more likely to support the death penalty
and prior research finds an association between punitive practices and
conservatism (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001),
we control for social and economic conservatism. We use the following
measure to account for social conservatism: “In terms of social issues,
do you consider yourself conservative, moderate, or liberal?” The
measure of economic conservative substituted economic issues for
social issues. Responses were coded as 1 if “conservative” was
selected and 0 if “liberal” or “moderate” was selected.
The descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the
analysis appear in Table 1. The descriptive statistics shown are for the
full AMS sample and our most restrictive model with a subsample of
245 respondents.
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As Table 1 indicates, the respondents in our model closely
resemble the full AMS sample on the racial attitudes measures.
Compared to the full AMS sample, the respondents in our model are a
bit less supportive of punitive criminal sanctions, more opposed to
welfare spending, and more likely to be male. This is an important
point because one potential concern with this study is the small
sample size. However, we maintain confidence in our findings because
most indicators included in the analysis have similar means and
variances between the full sample of respondents and the subsample
analyzed in this study. The subsample admittedly has a greater
proportion of men than the full sample of respondents, but in all other
respects the subsample mean scores and variances are either similar
or identical to the full sample.

Analytic Strategy and Statistical Models
Our analytic strategy proceeds in three stages. The first stage
examines whether opposition toward welfare expenditures and support
for punitive criminal sanctions are correlated at the bivariate level.
Second, we detect any changes to this relationship once other
variables are introduced.7 The estimation method is ordinary least
squares (OLS), because our dependent variable ranges from 0 to 9
and approximates a normal distribution. Model 1 only includes the
constant term and support for welfare expenditures to assess the
magnitude of the bivariate relationship. Model 2 inserts the control
variables to ascertain whether any relationship between support for
welfare expenditures and punitiveness holds after accounting for
demographic factors, political beliefs, income, unemployment, and
education.
Models 3 through 5 include all control variables and one racial
attitude measure. These model specifications permit us to observe how
each racial attitude measure influences the relationship between
opposition to welfare expenditures and support for criminal
punishment. Furthermore by examining the impact of each racial
attitude indicator separately, we can maintain over 800 cases for
Models 3 through 5. Model 6, the final multivariate OLS model,
possesses all control variables and all three racial attitude measures.
Although the subsample for Model 6 is relatively small, it is sufficient
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for meeting the assumptions of linear regression analysis.
Furthermore, finding a statistically significant effect is less likely with a
small sample than it is with a large sample, which gives us additional
confidence in our findings. The small sample would be problematic if
we were interpreting “null findings” or the assumption that the
covariates are not significant predictors for punitive attitudes. Because
this is not our approach; the relatively small sample for Model 6 does
not pose a serious concern for the results of this study.
Finally, based on the results of the regression analysis, we
construct a path model to show the relationship between racial
attitudes, welfare, and harsh criminal sanctions. In this path model,
we treat select indicators of racial prejudice as predicting opposition
toward expanding welfare expenditures and support for criminal
punishment. This model does not include a direct path between views
toward welfare expenditures and support for criminal punishment.
Because unique predictors of welfare and punishment are not available
in our data, we are unable to model a recursive relationship. That
being stated, the path model we specify can yield valuable insight on
the degree to which individual level racial animus simultaneously
predicts for views toward welfare and harsh criminal punishment.

Results
Multivariate Analysis
Results of the multivariate analysis reveal a nuanced impact of
racial prejudice and perceived racial threat on the relationship between
opposition to welfare spending and support for harsh criminal
punishment. As previously mentioned, Model 1 only contains the
welfare spending variable and the constant term, Models 2 and 3 add
additional predictors (see Table 2).
Model 2 contains the views of welfare expenditure variable plus
the control variables. Respondents with higher incomes are
significantly less likely to support punitive criminal sanctions (–.089, p
< 0.01) as are individuals who are unemployed (–.603, p < 0.01).
Respondents with postgraduate education are less likely to report
supporting harsh criminal punishment (–1.143, p < 0.001). White
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respondents are more likely to hold harsh punitive attitudes relative to
African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos (.373, p < 0.01) as are those
who report being economically conservative. Respondents that report
holding conservative views on economic issues are more supportive of
punitive sanctions than are respondents who report having moderate
or liberal views (.720, p < 0.001). Opposition to welfare spending
remains a significant predictor of punitive attitudes (.634, p < 0.001)
after controlling for individual demographics and political attitudes.
Model 3 adds perceived racial threat, Model 4 includes interracial marriage, and Model 5 contains work ethic. The results of these
models show that all three racial attitude measures are statistically
significant in each of the respective models. In Model 3, respondents
that perceive African Americans as a threat to public order and safety
are more likely to support harsh criminal punishment (.683, p <
0.001). Models and 4 and 5 indicate similar trends for both
respondents that do not approve of their child marrying a person of
African American descent (.481, p < 0.001) and for those that
reported believing that a lack of hard work explains the gap in
achievement between African Americans and Whites (.483, p <
0.001). These results support our contention that individual level racial
animus is an important factor in shaping punitive attitudes. Also
noteworthy is that the welfare expenditure measure is statistically
significant in all three models indicating that in isolation, the racial
attitude measures do not mitigate the relationship between opposition
toward welfare and punitive attitudes. However, these models only
provide a partial picture of how racial attitudes and perceived threat
condition the relationship between views of welfare expenditures and
penal sanctions.
We insert all three racial attitudes indicators in Model 6. We find
that White respondents (.727, p < 0.05) and social conservatives (.61,
p < 0.05) are more likely to support harsh criminal sanctions
statistically controlling for other factors in the model. In addition,
respondents with a postgraduate education (–1.314, p < 0.01), higher
incomes (–.19, p < 0.01), and those that report being unemployed (–
2.019, p < 0.01) all tend to be less punitive. Although many of these
results replicate from Model 2, we also observe important shifts from
previous models. First, the coefficient for the welfare spending variable
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decreases in magnitude and becomes nonsignificant (.15). This finding
confirms our key assumptions concerning the role of racial attitudes in
conditioning the relationship between opposition toward welfare and
support for harsh criminal punishment. Because it is inappropriate to
directly compare changing coefficient magnitude across these models
due to varying sample sizes, we also conducted additional analysis
where we estimated the baseline model with the same 245 cases
included in Model 6.8 In this supplementary analysis, the opposition to
welfare spending coefficient decreased by 66.7% (.150–.450/.450)
between the baseline and full models. Thus, including all three racial
attitudes indicators decreases the effect of the welfare expenditure
measure by two thirds and renders it nonsignificant. These results
highlight the importance of racial attitudes in conditioning the
relationship between opposition toward welfare and support for harsh
criminal sanctions.
Furthermore, we find that only two of the three racial attitudes
indicators are statistically significant in the final OLS regression model.
Respondents who would not approve of their child marrying a Black
person are more likely to support punitive criminal sanctions than
those who would approve (.514, p < 0.01), net of the other factors
included in the model. Second, respondents who believe that African
Americans on average do not do as well as Whites because of a lack of
hard work and effort are also more likely to support punitive criminal
sanctions than those who do not possess such beliefs (.612, p <
0.001). When the perceived threat measure is the sole racial attitude
indicator, in the multivariate models, it is statistically significant, but
the inclusion of any of the other racial attitude predictors reduces the
perceived threat predictor to nonsignificance. Although somewhat
counterintuitive, this finding suggests that the racial dynamics that
fuel the relationship between respondents’ views of welfare spending
and punitiveness is not one of perceived threat as we thought might
be the case. Rather, analysis of these data suggest that views of Black
inferiority (as expressed by resistance towards inter-racial marriages
and the belief that Blacks are lazy and do not work hard) are the key
concepts that link views in these two policy arenas. In this way, the
results of Model 6 also illuminate the importance of investigating the
role of multiple racial attitudes indicators when modeling for punitive
attitudes.
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As a final note on the multivariate regression models, we also
observed a change between Model 2 and Model 6. Namely, the social
conservative variable is nonsignificant in Models 2 through 5 but is
now statistically significant in Model 6. There are several factors
contributing to it. First, social conservatism is correlated with religious
fundamentalism (r = .314, p < 0.001) and economic conservatism (r
=.194, p < 0.001). We estimated Model 2 without these two variables
and social conservatism becomes significant (.577, p < 0.001).
Second, additional analysis9 of the 47 non-White respondents showed
that there is a correlation between the social conservative variable and
punitiveness even though this relationship does not hold for White
respondents. Last, the effect of the socially conservative indicator is
suppressed until all three racial attitude measures are included in the
model. If we exclude racial attitudes measures from the last model,
the coefficient for social conservatism becomes nonsignificant (.596, p
= .057).
In sum, accounting for all three racial attitude indicators in the
model unmasks unique contributions of the White dummy variable and
social conservative indicator in the models. Although the OLS models
shed light on the role racial prejudice plays in conditioning the
relationship between opposition toward welfare expenditures and
individual-level punitiveness, they do not fully capture the nature of
this intersection in the way we envision it. To better test for a more
complicated relationship between these factors, we employ a path
model.

Path Model Analysis
We constructed a path model that represents our vision of how
racial prejudice, support for welfare expenditures, and punitive
attitudes are interconnected (see Figure 2). The results of the
multivariate analysis guided construction of a parsimonious path model
that only includes the statistically significant racial attitude indicators
from Model 3. We specify the path model so that racial attitudes
predict attitudes toward welfare and punishment. As previously stated,
data limitations prohibit us from testing for a recursive path between
opposition to welfare spending and punitive attitudes. The model has
paths from the covert and overt racial prejudice indicators (the
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intermarriage and hard work variables, respectively) to the welfare
and punitive attitude measures. The purpose of the path model is to
test whether these specific dimensions of racial attitudes
simultaneously predict opposition to welfare spending and support for
punitive criminal sanctions.
The path model yields results that replicate the results of the
OLS models and are consistent with our assumptions concerning the
link between covert and overt racial prejudice and punitive attitudes.
In addition, it suggests that racial prejudice is a salient predictor of
opposition towards welfare expenditures. Disapproval of interracial
marriage is a statistically significant predictor of opposition to welfare
spending (.154, p < 0.05) and of support for punitive criminal
sanctions (.210, p < 0.01). Our measure of covert racial prejudice,
racial inequality due to lack of hard work, is a significant predictor
of punitive attitudes (.346, p < 0.01). In contrast, the hard work and
effort indicator is only a marginally significant predictor of attitudes
towards welfare spending (.122, p = .099).
Overall, the results of the path model support the conclusion
that respondents’ understandings of welfare and criminal punishment
are shaped by their antipathy toward African Americans. The findings
indicate that respondents who would disapprove of their child marrying
someone of African American descent are more likely to oppose
welfare spending and more likely to support harsh criminal punishment
than those who approve of interracial marriage. At the same time,
respondents who view racial inequality as resulting from a lack of hard
work on the part of Blacks score significantly higher on the punitive
attitude scale than those who do not view racial inequality as resulting
from a lack of hard work.
We were surprised that the hard work and effort measure is not
a more robust predictor of opposition to welfare spending given that
previous research indicates that Whites who believe Blacks have a
poor work ethic are more likely to oppose welfare (Gilens, 1999;
Kinder & Sanders, 1996). We would not interpret our results as
challenging previous scholarship because the absence of a significant
relationship between these variables could be the result of our small
sample size. Furthermore, the coefficient for our hard work and effort
Journal of Poverty, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2012): pg. 1-26. DOI. This article is © Routledge Taylor & Francis Group and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

21

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

measure was significant at the 0.1 p value in the expected direction.
In addition, we feel this bolsters our findings because the results affirm
many of our key hypotheses despite the small sample.

Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the analysis generally support our hypotheses.
The bivariate analysis indicates a connection between individual
attitudes toward welfare and punishment, in that those who oppose
welfare spending are also more likely to support punitive criminal
sanctions. This resembles the inverse relationship observed between
welfare and punishment at the level of policy and supports our first
hypothesis. Racial attitudes, however, mitigate the relationship
between support for criminal punishment and opposition to welfare
expenditures.
The results of the OLS regression analyses (see Table 2) support
many of our expectations. Consistent with our hypothesis, the
regression models show a significant relationship between opposition
to welfare spending and support for punitive criminal sanctions that
even holds after we introduce demographic and other control
variables. This relationship changes little when statistically controlling
for one racial attitude measure but accounting for all three
simultaneously decreases the relationship between welfare spending
attitudes and punitive attitudes to non-significance. Respondents who
disapprove of interracial marriage and believe that a lack of hard work
and effort explains why Blacks are, on average, economically worse off
than Whites express more support for punitive criminal sanctions. Our
results do not support the notion that respondents that perceive Blacks
as a threat to public order and safety would express more support for
punitive criminal sanctions than respondents that did not perceive
them as a threat.
This curious finding is not necessarily inconsistent with existing
literature in that perceived threat to public safety is not as salient in
shaping punitive attitudes compared to perceived economic threat
(King & Wheelock, 2007). It is also plausible that perceived threat is
not a salient predictor of punitive attitudes relative to other racial
attitude measures. As previously discussed, when perceived threat is
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the only racial attitude measure in the model, it is a statistically
significant predictor of punitive attitudes and it is not until the other
racial attitudes are included that it becomes non-significant.
The path model (see Figure 3) further explores the relationship
between racial attitudes, support for welfare, and punitive attitudes.
As we had proposed, disapproval of interracial marriage predicts
opposition to welfare spending and support for punitive criminal
sanctions. The data also indicate that respondents who feel that
African Americans are economically worse off than Whites because of
their own lack of hard work are significantly more likely to support
harsh criminal punishment and marginally more likely to oppose
welfare expenditures. As discussed above, these findings provide
limited support for our third hypothesis. We are not aware of other
research that examines the relationship between concern about the
work ethic of Blacks and attitudes towards criminal punishment.10
Thus, concern about the work ethic of Blacks may have a broader
impact on the individual outlooks of Americans than previously
thought. However, because this study is unable to include a recursive
relationship between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes,
future research should examine whether a recursive relationship
emerges between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes.
Future research efforts might also want to explore whether state
context contributes to the way in which racial attitudes, opposition
toward welfare expenditures, and support for harsh criminal
punishment are inter-related.
Based on the results at hand, we theorize that individual-level
opposition to welfare spending and support for strong criminal
sanctions reflects a desire to establish social control over marginalized
groups. This proposition extends Beckett and Western’s (1999)
suggestion that penal and welfare systems have converged into “a
single policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (p.
44) to the level of individual attitudes. Furthermore, we suggest that
the perceived need for such social control or “governance” is driven by
the fact that individuals located in penal and welfare systems are
disproportionately minorities and the related perception that they have
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engaged in undesirable behavior. Such behaviors include engaging in
crime, being dependent on welfare, and, for welfare recipients, and
having children outside of marriage.
Policies and public opinion reflect the stigmatization of welfare
receipt and criminality. Welfare recipients are generally categorized as
members of the undeserving poor, rather than as poor people who
deserve public assistance and sympathy (Katz, 1998; Steensland,
2006). Convicted criminals are stigmatized to an even greater extent,
as evidenced by the increasing severity of criminal punishment and by
the growing class of felons who have been stripped of basic rights of
citizenship, including the right to vote. Receiving welfare assistance
and criminality place individuals on the wrong side of moral divides
and subject them to intensive scrutiny and regulation. Although
benevolent intentions, such as the desire to promote economic
self-sufficiency and to protect people from crime, certainly play a role
in this scrutiny and regulation, the racial logic embedded in these
programs and policy arenas conditions their link with each other.
Similarly, racial attitudes connect welfare and punishment at the
individual level and explain preferences for punitive approaches.
Public perceptions of African Americans as undeserving welfare
recipients and incorrigible criminal threats have not gone unnoticed in
the political arena. Politicians have strategically utilized White fears
and stereotypes to win elections (Mendelberg, 2001) and to shift
legislative outcomes (Wheelock & Hartmann, 2007). Many of these
perceptions fit neatly into conservative arguments in support of
expanding criminal justice and contracting public assistance. By the
mid-1990s, however, political liberals and conservatives alike called for
expanding crime control and reforming welfare. Unable to challenge
the prevailing racial logic of welfare recipients and criminals, some
liberals have operated within this paradigm even while arguing for less
punitive welfare reforms and penal policies than conservatives. Thus,
racialized understandings of welfare and criminal punishment have
influenced the politics and public perceptions of crime, punishment and
welfare.
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Notes
1. Social scientists have debated the role of public attitudes in policy
formation. Some argue that elites set the stage for policy formation and
then work to garner support for specific pieces of legislation (Beckett,
1994), others posit that the link between policy and public opinion is a
populist one whereby political leaders are beholden to their constituency
and thus seek to advance legislation that already has considerable public
support (Savelsberg, 1994). We do not attempt to advance either of these
positions and only rely on the notion that public opinion and public policy
are connected in deep and important ways.
2. The 2001 estimate excludes probationers in prison or jail.
3. Remaining welfare recipients are racially classified as Asian, Native
American, Other, or Unknown (Schram, 2006, p. 207).
4. The survey’s purpose was to collect data on respondents’ attitudes about
the role of race in American society; therefore, African Americans and
Hispanics were oversampled to ensure adequate representation of these
populations for making comparisons across racial groups. This
oversampling was accomplished by calling more heavily in areas that have
high concentrations of African Americans and Hispanics (the survey was
conducted in Spanish when requested).
5. Although this is not ideal, we conducted additional analyses with different
combinations of the racial attitude indicators to include additional cases
and the results generally replicate. In addition, we show how our sample
compares with the full AMP sample in the following description of the
variables used in our analyses. We discuss the implications for a small
sample and why we maintain confidence in the results later in the
following section.
6. Other explanations for racial inequality consisted of racial discrimination
and social institutions. These were excluded from this study because our
attention is focused on covert racial prejudice.
7. We specify support for punitive criminal sanctions as the dependent
variable but this model specification was somewhat arbitrary. Support for
welfare expenditures could have been the dependent variable since our
primary argument rests on the prediction that the relationship between
the two is spurious after we include racial attitude measures. However,
the tradition of punishment and welfare research tends to specify
punishment as the dependent variable both theoretically (Garland, 1985,
2001) and empirically (Beckett & Western, 1999).
8. The results of these additional analyses are available from the authors
upon request.
9. Available from the authors upon request.
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10. As previously mentioned, extant research links concern about the work
ethic of African Americans to opposition to welfare and other racial social
policies (Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996).
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FIGURE 1 Percentage of the population that has received aid to families with
dependent children/temporary assistance to needy families benefits and prison rates in
the United States, 1980–2006.
Sources. U.S. Department of Justice (2003, 2007), Carter et al. (2006), U.S. Census
Bureau (2008), U.S. House of Representatives (2004).
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FIGURE 2 Path analysis: Effects of overt and covert racial attitudes on opposition to
welfare spending and punitive attitudes.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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